[Advanced] — moving from one machine to the next, and from a foothold to owning the domain.

The kid version first

Lateral movement is using credentials from one machine to log into another — spreading sideways across the network. Escalation is climbing from a normal account to a powerful one. They interleave: you move to a machine, harvest better credentials, use them to move somewhere better, until you reach a Domain Admin or the Domain Controller itself.

Lateral movement — the techniques

Once you have valid credentials (or a hash, or a ticket), you execute code on other machines using legitimate Windows remote-administration protocols:

MethodProtocolNotes
PsExecSMB + service creationClassic, noisy, drops a service. impacket’s psexec.py
WMIWMI/RPCQuieter; wmiexec.py. Common
WinRMWinRM (5985/5986)evil-winrm; clean shells if you have the right
DCOMDCOMAlternative when others are blocked
RDPRDPInteractive; leaves the most traces
SMB execSMBsmbexec.py

These are the same tools admins use. That’s the point — lateral movement blends into normal administrative traffic, which is why it evades signature detection and why defenders must watch for patterns (one account authenticating to twenty machines in a minute) rather than tools.

nxc smb <range> -u user -H hash -x "command" sprays a command across every host that accepts the credential — this is how one hash becomes fifty shells.

The escalation techniques — the named attacks

These are the BloodHound edges made real. In rough order of how you’ll meet them:

DCSync — steal every hash without touching the DC’s disk.
Any account with the replication rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes) — Domain Admins have them, but so do surprisingly many delegated accounts — can ask a DC to replicate password data, which is a legitimate DC-to-DC operation. You get every account’s hash, including KRBTGT’s:

secretsdump.py -just-dc corp.local/admin@10.0.0.1
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /user:krbtgt

Finding an account with replication rights that you can compromise is a top BloodHound win — it hands you the whole domain database.

Golden Ticket — forge any TGT, forever.
With KRBTGT’s hash (from DCSync), you forge a TGT for any user, including a fabricated Domain Admin. Because the TGT is encrypted with KRBTGT’s key (Kerberos), the KDC accepts it. This is the ultimate persistence — it survives password resets of every account except KRBTGT, and KRBTGT is almost never rotated:

mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:<domain-SID> /krbtgt:<hash> /ptt

Silver Ticket — forge a ticket to one service.
With a service account’s hash, forge a service ticket to that one service. Narrower than Golden (one service, not the domain) but stealthier — it never contacts the DC at all, so the DC logs nothing.

ACL abuse — the misconfiguration goldmine.
Dangerous rights over an object, which BloodHound surfaces:

  • GenericAll / WriteDACL over a user → reset their password, or grant yourself rights
  • WriteDACL over a group → add yourself to it (e.g. into Domain Admins)
  • GenericWrite over a user → set an SPN on them and Kerberoast (targeted Kerberoasting), or configure delegation
  • Owns → change the object’s ACL, then do any of the above

These are pure misconfiguration — over-generous delegated permissions accumulated over years — and they’re the most common real-world path.

Delegation abuse.
Kerberos delegation lets a service act on behalf of a user (so a web app can reach a database as you). Misconfigured:

  • Unconstrained delegation — a server so configured caches the TGT of anyone who connects. Get admin on it, coerce a Domain Admin (or a DC’s computer account, via the printer bug / PetitPotam) to authenticate to it, and steal their TGT
  • Constrained / RBCD (Resource-Based Constrained Delegation) — abuse GenericWrite over a computer object to configure delegation to it and impersonate any user to its services. A very common modern escalation

Certificate abuse (ADCS).
If the org runs Active Directory Certificate Services, misconfigured certificate templates (the ESC1–ESC16 family) let a low-priv user request a certificate that authenticates as a Domain Admin. certipy find enumerates vulnerable templates. One of the most impactful modern AD attack surfaces, and frequently present.

Persistence

Once you own the domain, staying in:

  • Golden Ticket (above) — the classic
  • DCShadow — register a rogue DC and push malicious changes
  • AdminSDHolder / ACL backdoors — grant yourself rights that survive cleanup
  • Skeleton Key — patch LSASS on a DC to accept a master password

The defensive implication is grim: true recovery from KRBTGT compromise requires rotating the KRBTGT password twice and often rebuilding trust — which is why “assume breach” and monitoring matter more than any single control → defending AD.

The full kill chain

1. foothold      one credential (spray / phish / Responder)
2. enumerate     BloodHound → shortest path to DA
3. harvest       Kerberoast; mimikatz on owned boxes
4. move          pass-the-hash across machines with nxc/psexec
5. escalate      ACL abuse / delegation / ADCS / DCSync
6. domain admin  DCSync KRBTGT → Golden Ticket
7. persist       and, on an engagement, DOCUMENT every step

Key insight

Escalation in AD is a chain of legitimate features abused with harvested credentials — DCSync is a real replication operation, Golden Tickets exploit real Kerberos trust, ACL and delegation abuse exploit real (over-generous) permissions. The DC is usually patched; the domain falls through misconfiguration and credential reuse anyway. The single most important target is KRBTGT’s hash, because it forges tickets forever — which is why the endgame is always DCSync, and why recovering from it is so painful for defenders.

Source: [reference] — Aug 2026. Authorised-testing / lab material.

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