[Advanced] — the four techniques that turn one foothold into more accounts, and why “hash = password” is the recurring theme.
The kid version first
In Windows networks you often don’t need to know someone’s password — you need their password hash, or a ticket, both of which work just as well as the password itself. So credential attacks are about harvesting these password-equivalents: stealing them from memory, capturing them off the wire, or forcing the system to hand you something crackable.
“The hash is as good as the password” is the single idea behind most of this.
1. Kerberoasting — the most reliable AD attack
Recall from Kerberos: a service ticket is encrypted with the service account’s password hash, and any authenticated user can request one.
GetUserSPNs.py corp.local/alice:Password1 -request -dc-ip 10.0.0.1
→ dumps a $krb5tgs$ hash for every service account with an SPN
hashcat -m 13100 hashes.txt rockyou.txt
→ crack them offline, at whatever speed your GPU allows
Why it works so well:
- Needs only one valid domain account — no privilege
- Service accounts are frequently set up with weak, human-chosen, non-expiring passwords (
Summer2019!, the company name) - Cracking is offline — no lockout, no logging on the DC beyond a normal ticket request
- Service accounts are often over-privileged (local admin everywhere, sometimes Domain Admin)
This is usually the first thing to try after getting any credential. It’s low-noise, low-risk, and frequently yields a high-value account.
2. AS-REP Roasting — no credentials needed
If an account has “Kerberos pre-authentication not required” set (a legacy compatibility option), the KDC will send an AS-REP — encrypted with that account’s password hash — to anyone who asks, without proving they’re that user.
GetNPUsers.py corp.local/ -usersfile users.txt -no-pass -dc-ip 10.0.0.1
→ for any pre-auth-disabled account, dumps a $krb5asrep$ hash
hashcat -m 18200 hashes.txt rockyou.txt
This needs no credentials at all — just a list of usernames (from OSINT, kerbrute, or a null session). Rarer than Kerberoastable accounts, but a genuine no-auth foothold when present.
3. Pass-the-Hash — skip cracking entirely
Because NTLM authenticates with the hash directly (02), if you steal an NTLM hash you can authenticate as that user without ever cracking it:
nxc smb 10.0.0.0/24 -u administrator -H <NTLM_hash>
→ authenticates as administrator to every box that accepts that hash
psexec.py -hashes :<NTLM_hash> administrator@10.0.0.5
→ a shell, no password
This is why a stolen hash is a full compromise, not a puzzle to solve. It’s also why local admin password reuse is catastrophic — the same local admin hash on 500 machines means one hash owns all 500. (Microsoft’s LAPS exists precisely to randomise local admin passwords per machine → defending AD.)
Pass-the-Ticket is the Kerberos equivalent — steal or forge a ticket and inject it into your session (Rubeus, mimikatz).
4. Harvesting credentials from a machine
Once you have admin on a box, you loot it for credentials to other accounts:
- mimikatz — the famous tool.
sekurlsa::logonpasswordsdumps hashes (and, on older/misconfigured systems, plaintext passwords via WDigest) of everyone logged into that machine from LSASS memory. A Domain Admin logged into a server you own = their credentials in your hands - LSASS dump — snapshot the LSASS process memory (comsvcs.dll, Task Manager, nanodump) and parse it offline with mimikatz/pypykatz. Quieter than running mimikatz directly, which every EDR flags
- SAM + SYSTEM — the local account database;
secretsdump.pyextracts local hashes - DPAPI — decrypt saved browser passwords, Wi-Fi keys, RDP credentials
- Files — config files, scripts, and
SYSVOL(the old GPPcpasswordbug stored an AES-encrypted password with a publicly known key in group policy — still found in legacy environments)
Harvesting is the engine of lateral movement: each machine you own yields credentials to accounts that own other machines → lateral movement.
Getting the first credential (pre-foothold)
Before any of the above, you need one credential. The usual doors:
- Password spraying — try one common password (
Winter2025!) against many users. Stays under the lockout threshold that guessing many passwords against one user would trip.nxc,kerbrute - Responder — poison LLMNR/NBT-NS to capture NTLMv2 hashes when a machine mistypes a share name → crack, or relay
- NTLM relay (
ntlmrelayx) — relay a captured authentication to another service instead of cracking it — no cracking needed if SMB signing isn’t enforced - Phishing → social engineering
- Found credentials — password reuse, credentials in code, breach dumps → the reuse problem
Cracking, practically
hashcat -m 13100 kerb.txt rockyou.txt -r rules/best64.rule # Kerberoast
hashcat -m 1000 ntlm.txt rockyou.txt # raw NTLM
NTLM hashes are unsalted and fast to crack — billions per second on a GPU — which is a reason the hash is the target, not the plaintext. Wordlists + rules beat brute force. hashcat’s mode number depends on the hash type; knowing -m 13100 (Kerberoast), -m 18200 (AS-REP), -m 1000 (NTLM) covers most of it → cracking.
Key insight
In AD, a hash or a ticket is a password-equivalent, so credential attacks aim to harvest those rather than to learn passwords — Kerberoasting hands you an offline-crackable hash for any service account, pass-the-hash skips cracking entirely, and mimikatz loots the credentials of everyone logged into a machine you own. The engine of a whole-domain compromise is that each machine yields credentials to accounts that own other machines, so the attack compounds: one weak service password becomes Domain Admin in a few hops.
Related
- lateral movement — spending the credentials you harvested
- Kerberos — why service tickets are crackable
- cryptographic attacks — offline cracking
- defending AD — LAPS, managed service accounts, tiering
Source: [reference] — Aug 2026.
Software engineering
Infrastructure & security
Computer science
Hardware & engineering