[Intermediate → Advanced] — Your CI system holds production credentials and runs arbitrary third-party code. Secret handling, least privilege, dependency scanning, OIDC instead of long-lived keys, and supply-chain hardening.
Secret Management Best Practices
# ✅ Good: use secrets context
- run: ./deploy.sh
env:
API_KEY: ${{ secrets.API_KEY }}
# ❌ Bad: hardcoded secret in workflow
- run: API_KEY=mysecret ./deploy.sh
# ❌ Bad: printing secrets (GitHub masks common secrets but not all)
- run: echo "Key is ${{ secrets.API_KEY }}"
# ✅ Mask custom values in logs
- name: Set dynamic secret
run: |
TOKEN=$(generate_token.sh)
echo "::add-mask::$TOKEN" # mask this value in all future log output
echo "token=$TOKEN" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUTPrinciple of Least Privilege
# Declare minimal permissions at workflow level
permissions:
contents: read
# Override with more permissions only where needed
jobs:
build:
permissions:
packages: write # only this job writes packagesDependency Scanning
# Dependabot — automatically open PRs for vulnerable dependencies
# .github/dependabot.yml
version: 2
updates:
- package-ecosystem: npm
directory: /
schedule:
interval: weekly
open-pull-requests-limit: 10
groups:
devDependencies:
dependency-type: devDependencies
- package-ecosystem: docker
directory: /
schedule:
interval: weekly
- package-ecosystem: github-actions
directory: /
schedule:
interval: weekly
# npm audit in CI
- name: Check for vulnerabilities
run: npm audit --audit-level=high
# Fails if any HIGH or CRITICAL vulnerabilities foundOIDC for Cloud Authentication
Instead of storing long-lived cloud credentials as secrets, use OpenID Connect to get short-lived tokens:
# No AWS keys stored in GitHub — uses OIDC token instead
permissions:
id-token: write # required for OIDC
contents: read
jobs:
deploy:
steps:
- name: Configure AWS credentials via OIDC
uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
with:
role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::123456789:role/github-actions-role
aws-region: us-east-1
# No access key or secret key — GitHub gets a temporary token from AWS
- run: aws s3 ls # authenticated automaticallyPreventing Supply Chain Attacks
# ✅ Pin actions to a specific commit SHA (most secure)
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
# ✅ Pin to a version tag (less secure but practical)
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
# ❌ Avoid mutable refs
- uses: actions/checkout@main # main could be changed by anyone
# ✅ Use dependabot to keep action versions updated
# .github/dependabot.yml includes github-actions ecosystemHardening Workflows
# Restrict what third-party actions can access
permissions:
contents: read # most restrictive by default
# Prevent script injection via PR titles/body
- name: Safe use of PR title
run: echo "PR title:" $TITLE # ❌ vulnerable to injection if TITLE contains backticks
env:
TITLE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}
- name: Safe use of PR title
run: echo "PR title: $TITLE" # ✅ passed as env var, not shell-interpolated
env:
TITLE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}Related
- Secret Management — where secrets should live
- Cybersecurity — supply-chain attacks in their wider context
- Contexts and Secrets — the mechanics being hardened here
- CI/CD module map
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