[reference] — from the roadmap.sh cyber-security roadmap. Moving from reactive (wait for an alert) to proactive (know your adversary, go looking) defense — and the frameworks that give the whole field a shared language for attacker behavior.
Threat intelligence
Threat intelligence is knowledge about adversaries — who they are, what they target, how they operate — used to defend proactively. It ranges from:
- Strategic — high-level trends for leadership (which threat actors target our industry).
- Operational — attacker campaigns, tactics, and infrastructure.
- Tactical — concrete IOCs (Indicators of Compromise): malicious IPs, domains, file hashes, URLs you can feed into detection.
OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence) is gathering intel from public sources — WHOIS, DNS records, certificate transparency, social media, breach dumps, Shodan. It’s how attackers do reconnaissance and how defenders discover their own exposed assets and track adversaries. Sources feed threat-intel platforms (MISP, commercial feeds) that share indicators across the community.
The maturity note: IOCs (hashes, IPs) are the lowest rung — attackers change them cheaply. Higher-value intel is TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, Procedures) — how an adversary behaves — which is much harder for them to change, which is exactly what the frameworks below capture.
The frameworks — a shared language for attacks
These give defenders a structured way to describe, detect, and communicate about attacker behavior:
Cyber Kill Chain (Lockheed Martin)
Models an intrusion as sequential stages: Reconnaissance → Weaponization → Delivery → Exploitation → Installation → Command & Control (C2) → Actions on Objectives. The value: every stage is a chance to break the chain — detect and disrupt at any step and the attack fails. It maps cleanly onto the offensive pentest methodology.
MITRE ATT&CK
The industry-standard knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques, observed from real attacks. Organized as a matrix: tactics (the why — the adversary’s goal, e.g. Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Lateral Movement, Exfiltration) across the top, and techniques (the how — specific methods, each with an ID like T1566 Phishing) underneath. It’s the lingua franca of blue teams — detection rules, threat reports, and hunts are all mapped to ATT&CK technique IDs, so everyone means the same thing. If you learn one framework deeply, learn this one.
Diamond Model
Analyzes an intrusion via four linked vertices — Adversary, Capability, Infrastructure, Victim — for understanding who is attacking how against whom, useful for attribution and connecting related incidents.
Threat hunting
Threat hunting is proactively searching for attackers who evaded automated detection — assuming breach and going to look, rather than waiting for an alert. A hunt is hypothesis-driven: “if an attacker used pass-the-hash for lateral movement (an ATT&CK technique), I’d see this pattern in the logs — let me search for it.” The hunter queries the SIEM/EDR data, confirms or refutes, and — crucially — turns any finding into a new automated detection so the next occurrence alerts on its own.
Hunting is what separates a mature SOC from an alert-monitoring one: it finds the sophisticated, low-and-slow adversaries (APTs) that never trip a signature. It depends on good telemetry (logs/EDR), knowledge of ATT&CK, and understanding your own environment’s “normal.”
Related
- Logging, SIEM & Detection — the data hunts run against
- Incident Response — what a confirmed hunt finding triggers
- Reconnaissance — OSINT from the offensive side
Software engineering
Infrastructure & security
Computer science
Hardware & engineering